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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
According to the new governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, aligning the 
Bank’s corporate bond purchase scheme with the government’s climate goals is a 
‘perfectly sensible thing to do’ and should be made a ‘priority’. Yet in its current 
framework, the pandemic corporate bond purchase programme is heavily biased 
towards carbon-intensive sectors – and thus at odds with the government’s 
environmental objectives. This carbon bias means the programme may lower the cost of 
borrowing (an implicit subsidy) and encourage more debt issuance by the most carbon-
intensive firms relative to low-carbon firms. To help support the governor’s efforts, this 
briefing sets out two alternative purchase strategies – the ‘Lower-carbon pandemic QE’ 
scenario and the ‘Low-carbon pandemic QE’ scenario − that would help decarbonise 
the Bank’s corporate bond purchases (boosting green investment in the process) and 
ensure that the Bank’s policy interventions are consistent with its rhetoric.       
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2020, the Bank of England (BoE) announced new measures to support the UK 
economy in withstanding the COVID-19 crisis. The Bank committed to expand its 
Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme (CBPS) by a further £10bn, bringing the Bank’s 
holding of sterling non-financial corporate bonds to £20bn. However, in its current 
guise, the CBPS is misaligned with the government’s climate goals and implicitly creates 
better financing conditions for carbon-intensive economic activities. The CBPS biases 
the allocation of capital towards carbon-intensive sectors, while at the same time failing 
to reflect climate-related financial risks.  
 
The CBPS is therefore not only at odds with government climate targets but also 
previous BoE climate commitments. Indeed, by its own admission the Bank has stated 
that CBPS is aligned with 3.5°C of warming by the end of the century.1 Moreover, just 
two weeks before announcing the expansion of the CBPS, governor Andrew Bailey 
suggested that excluding fossil fuels and realigning the Bank’s corporate bond portfolio 
with the government’s climate goals is a ‘perfectly sensible thing to do’.2 More than ever, 
an alternative framework for the CBPS is both urgent and necessary – especially if the 
Bank plans to expand the CBPS in the future. As it stands, the CBPS is a missed 
opportunity to propel investments that are supportive of a green recovery and the 
transition towards a low-carbon economy.        
 
To help the Bank align its purchases with national and international climate objectives 
and support a green recovery, we offer a framework that would reduce the carbon 
impact of the CBPS. We first show that carbon-intensive sectors are over-represented in 
the Bank’s list of eligible bonds, despite their relatively lower contribution to UK 
employment and Gross Value Added (GVA). Then, we develop two scenarios for better 
climate alignment of the BoE’s unconventional purchases. 
 
The Lower-carbon pandemic QE scenario eliminates the bonds issued by the most carbon-
intensive sectors and adds bonds that can be conducive to a greener economy, while still 
meeting the Bank’s key eligibility criteria. The second, a fully Low-carbon pandemic QE 
scenario, eliminates the vast majority of bonds issued by all carbon-intensive sectors, 
adding bonds issued by sectors that are not carbon intensive. Both scenarios keep the 
volume of purchasable bonds at roughly the same level as in the Bank’s original CBPS 
list, indicating that concerns about a potential lower aggregate stock of purchasable 
bonds are easily dismissed as grounds for not implementing these options.   
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2. IS THERE A CARBON BIAS IN THE 
BANK’S CORPORATE QE PROGRAMME?  
The CBPS was first launched as part of a broader monetary stimulus package in August 
2016. Corporate bond purchases would increase demand for such bonds and therefore 
reduce their yields. This in turn would lower the cost of borrowing, encouraging 
corporates to increase their investment beyond what it might otherwise have been. The 
programme also aimed to lower bond yields more broadly, through portfolio 
rebalancing.3 Overall the objective of these bond purchases was to bring inflation to 
target by increasing spending in the economy.  
 
The Bank implements the corporate QE programme by first specifying a list of eligible 
bonds and then purchasing a portion of these eligible bonds. The purchases are made in 
a way that is intended to replicate the sectoral decomposition of the current bond 
market, in line with the ‘market neutrality’ principle. The Bank applies this principle by 
specifying the sector that each bond has been issued by (a nine-sector classification is 
used) and making purchases so that its aggregate holdings are representative of each 
sector’s share. For example, as of July 1st 2020, 19% of eligible corporate bonds were 
classified under the ‘electricity sector’, accordingly 19% of the Bank’s purchases are 
intended to be from the electricity sector.4      
 
Table 1 shows the sectoral breakdown of the outstanding amount of corporate bonds 
(the amount of money corporates have borrowed via the bond market) that are included 
in the BoE’s list of eligible bonds according to their NACE codes, which was announced 
on 4th June 2020. It maps this sectoral decomposition against the contribution of each 
sector in UK GHG emissions, UK employment and UK GVA. It is clear that sectors with 
a high contribution to emissions are over-represented in the BoE’s eligibility list. Take two of 
the highest polluting sectors. ‘Electricity, gas and steam and air conditioning supply’ 
contributes only 0.4% to the UK employment and only 1.7% to the UK GVA, but 
accounts for 23.9% of the total eligible bonds. The purchasable bonds from the 
manufacturing sector correspond to 24.9% of the total eligible bonds, while the 
contribution of this sector to the UK employment and GVA is only 8% and 10.3% 
respectively.5  
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Table 1: Sectoral breakdown of the BoE list of eligible bonds (outstanding amount), UK greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, UK employment and UK GVA  
NACE 
code Sector 
BoE eligible 
bonds by amount 
outstanding (%) 
Contribution 
to UK GHG 
emissions (%) 
Contributio
n to UK 
employmen
t (%) 
Contribution 
to UK GVA (%) 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.1 12.3 1.2 0.6 
B Mining and quarrying 0.4 5.9 0.2 0.8 
C Manufacturing 24.9 19.7 8.0 10.3 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 23.9 19.6 0.4 1.7 
E 
Water supply; sewerage, 
waste management and 
remediation activities 
9.9 5.9 0.6 1.4 
F Construction 3.7 3.3 7.2 6.3 
G 
Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
5.0 4.3 14.7 10.8 
H Transportation and storage 4.5 21.8 4.7 4.0 
I Accommodation and food service activities 0.5 0.9 6.6 2.7 
J Information and communication 12.7 0.4 4.5 6.6 
K Financial and insurance activities 0.3 0.0 3.3 7.1 
L Real estate activities 4.9 0.2 1.7 13.8 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities 1.9 0.6 8.0 7.7 
N Administrative and support service activities 3.8 0.9 8.4 5.0 
O 
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory social 
security 
0.0 1.3 4.2 4.6 
P Education 1.3 0.7 8.3 5.8 
Q Human health and social work activities 2.0 1.6 12.4 7.4 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.0 0.4 2.8 1.5 
S Other service activities 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.5 
T 
Activities of households as 
employers; 
undifferentiated goods & 
services producing 
activities of households for 
own use 
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Total 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Bank of England (bond ISIN codes, as of 4 June 2020), TR Eikon (bond outstanding amount, June 2020), Eurostat (employment [2018], 
GVA [2016] and GHG emissions [2018])   
 
Using a more granular classification of sectors, we further confirm the carbon bias of the 
BoE list of eligible bonds. We identify four carbon-intensive sectors:6 
(a) Fossil fuel sectors that perform activities like the extraction of natural gas, the 
mining of hard coal and the manufacture of refined petroleum products;  
(b) energy-intensive sectors, most of which undertake manufacturing activities;  
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(c) utilities that are involved for example in the production and distribution of 
electricity;  
(d) carbon-intensive sectors which are those sectors engaging in activities related 
primarily to car, air and sea transportation.     
 
These sectors comprise approximately 57% of the value of the bonds that are part of the 
BoE list (amount outstanding),7 although their GVA share is only 19% (see Figure 1). 
Therefore, the sectoral allocation of purchases is inconsistent with sectoral make-up of 
the UK when it comes to GVA share and is considerably lopsided towards the most 
carbon-intensive sectors. The carbon bias also holds when we use the employment 
share instead of the GVA share. 8 
 
Figure 1: Carbon-intensive sectors in BoE list of eligible bonds and UK GVA 
 
Sources: Bank of England (bond ISIN codes, as of 4 June 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors and bond outstanding amount, June 2020), 
ONS, Annual Business Survey (GVA, 2018) and authors’ calculations 
 
Given the above, and since central banks purchase lowers bond yields (the cost of 
financing) of those companies that are eligible under the scheme,9 a likely unintended 
repercussion of the CBPS is a lower cost of borrowing and more debt issued by the most 
carbon-intensive firms relative to low-carbon firms. In effect, the most carbon-intensive 
companies are potentially indirectly subsidised by the Bank.  
 
The structural carbon bias in the CBPS is not only at odds with the government’s climate 
goals but fails to reflect the financial risks associated with the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. The CBPS is therefore inconsistent with the BoE’s policy and messaging 
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
Carbon-intensive
transportation
Utilities
Energy-intensive
Fossil-fuel
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Outstanding amount in the BoE list UK GVA
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surrounding high-carbon investments and the high prudential standards to which it is 
attempting to hold other private entities to account.  
 
But what is the source of this carbon bias? The BoE determines the list of eligible bonds 
by applying a set of criteria to the entire universe of sterling non-financial corporate 
bonds. These criteria include, for example, the amount in issue, the credit rating of the 
bond and the extent to which the issuers of the bonds make a material contribution to 
the UK economy.10 In Table 2 we show how the proportion of the carbon-intensive 
sectors changes as we start from the universe of non-financial corporate bonds and we 
apply step-by-step the eligibility criteria. While the carbon bias already exists in the 
universe of bonds, it becomes worse as the eligibility criteria are applied. In particular, 
the criterion on the contribution to the UK economy (see last column) sharpens the 
carbon bias significantly.11  
 
Table 2: Contribution of the carbon-intensive sectors to the UK GVA and the outstanding amount of 
bonds in the sterling non-financial corporate bond market and the BoE list  
 
Share 
of UK 
GVA 
(%) 
1: All 
sterling 
non-
financial 
corporate 
bonds 
(%) 
2: 
(1)+eligible 
maturity 
(%) 
3: 
(2)+investmen
t grade 
(%) 
4: 
(3)+eligible 
amount in 
issue 
(%) 
5: 
(4)+contribution 
to the UK 
economy 
(BoE list*) 
(%) 
Fossil-fuel 0.8 3.8 4.1 5.1 5.0 8.6 
Energy-
intensive 5.6 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 6.3 
Utilities 2.6 12.4 12.6 16.2 15.6 28.3 
Carbon-
intensive 
transportation 
10.0 9.0 9.3 10.1 10.1 13.3 
Non carbon-
intensive 
sectors 
81.0 71.4 70.3 64.5 65.1 43.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Bank of England (bond ISIN codes, as of 4 June 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors, bond outstanding amount and other financial 
and economic variables, June 2020) and authors’ calculations 
* Note that the Bank of England (BoE) uses several other criteria to derive the full list, on top of the five described in the table. These additional 
criteria are described in Appendix A2. 
 
As mentioned above, the Bank’s interventions in corporate bond markets are in theory 
guided by the ‘market neutrality’ principle: purchase a representative portion such that 
the CBPS does not favour some issuing firms over others. However, the evidence 
presented here suggests that, despite this principle, the CBPS implicitly favours carbon-
intensive sectors and firms. Indeed, simply attempting to reflect the composition of the 
bond market at a given point in time inevitably leads the BoE to reproduce the same 
market failures to price in climate change and carbon biases that now characterise the 
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market more generally. Ultimately, a concerted decision to align the CBPS with the 
market structure, rather than environmental goals and climate risks, is a choice to 
maintain the status quo – and a significant missed opportunity to propel investments 
that support a green economy.     
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3. ALTERNATIVE PURCHASE STRATEGIES 
3.1 THE LOWER-CARBON PANDEMIC QE SCENARIO 
In order to decarbonise the BoE list of eligible bonds, we first remove bonds issued by 
fossil fuel and energy-intensive sectors. We replace them with: 
(i) green bonds, which are bonds that intend to fund climate mitigation and 
adaptation projects (see Appendix A2 for the exact definition); 
(ii) bonds issued by companies that belong to what we call ‘potentially green’ 
sectors and have at the same time a relatively low emission intensity12 - we 
identify ‘potentially green’ sectors drawing on the recently developed EU 
Taxonomy of sustainable activities (see Appendix A2 for the details).  
 
All the bonds that we have added meet the Bank’s main criteria: they are all sterling 
non-financial, investment grade and are eligible according to their maturity and amount 
in issue.13  
 
Figure 2 presents our Lower-carbon BoE list. The carbon-intensive sectors correspond to 
40% of the outstanding amount instead of the original 57%. The proportion of green 
bonds and potentially green sectors has increased from 16% to 33%.14 The outstanding 
amount in the Lower-carbon list remains roughly the same as in the BoE list (£144bn vs 
£140bn).  
 
Figure 2: BoE list vs Lower-carbon lists   
 
Sources: Bank of England (bond ISIN codes, as of 4 June 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors, bond outstanding amount and other financial 
and economic variables, June 2020) and authors’ calculations 
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3.2 THE LOW-CARBON PANDEMIC QE SCENARIO 
However, our Lower-carbon BoE list is only partially decarbonised. To arrive at a more 
substantial decarbonisation, we exclude bonds issued both by utilities and carbon-
intensive transportation in addition to those issued by fossil fuel and energy-intensive 
sectors. Our Low-carbon list (see Figure 2) retains the green bonds issued by utilities 
and carbon-intensive transportation sectors.15  
 
While we cannot identify additional green bonds and bonds issued by the potentially 
green sectors that would meet the BoE criteria regarding currency, investment grade, 
maturity and the amount in issue, we add bonds issued by ‘other’ companies that do not 
belong to the carbon-intensive sectors. These include corporates such as real estate 
companies, health insurance companies, hospitals, restaurants and universities. Our 
Low-carbon list includes bonds that have been issued by such companies that have both 
1) a relatively low emission intensity, and 2) headquarters in the UK.16 The outstanding 
amount of bonds in the Low-carbon list is close to the amount in the current BoE list 
(£118bn vs £140bn). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 DECARBONISING THE BANK OF ENGLAND’S PANDEMIC QE: PERFECTLY SENSIBLE? 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank of England pandemic QE is a missed opportunity for the Bank to contribute to 
the transition to a low-carbon economy and stop supporting environmentally harmful 
activities. Although the Bank recognises that a low-carbon QE programme is a ‘perfectly 
sensible thing to do’, this is currently not reflected in their bond eligibility criteria. To 
this end, we have presented two scenarios that would easily allow the Bank to match its 
rhetoric. The Bank should first replace the list of eligible bonds with one of our 
suggested Lower-carbon lists and then use this list as a basis for the new purchases that 
it will conduct in the next few months. Since in our low-carbon lists, the amount of 
bonds does not change significantly compared to the existing list, their use would not 
undermine the cyclical role that the QE programme is intended to play.  
 
Apart from changing the structure of the existing QE programme, the Bank of England 
could also consider the possibility of running a separate permanent corporate QE 
programme with the explicit aim of supporting green bonds on a persistent, long-term 
basis, for example by committing itself to purchase a specific proportion of eligible green 
bonds.17 Such a programme could support the expansion of the green bond market, 
irrespective of the decisions that are taken about the cyclical QE programmes.     
 
Would our proposals require a change in the mandate of the Bank of England? This is 
not necessarily the case. A broader interpretation of the financial stability mandate 
might suffice. Bonds issued by carbon-intensive sectors can be excluded from the 
corporate bond programme based on the rationale that they exhibit potentially high 
climate transition risks. The Bank could also view the support of green bonds as a way of 
contributing to the reduction of the long-run physical financial risks that stem from 
climate change.  
 
Low-carbon and green corporate QE programmes would not in any case be sufficient to 
ensure the transition to a low-carbon economy. Fiscal policies have a stronger and more 
substantial role to play in achieving such a transition quickly.18 But the urgency of the 
climate crisis requires that all policy tools are used for the purpose of avoiding a climate 
breakdown. It is also crucial that the decarbonisation of the Bank of England QE 
programmes would provide a very clear signal to the financial markets that the era of 
‘dirty’ finance would soon come to an end.      
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APPENDIX 
A1. CARBON-INTENSIVE SECTORS AND UK 
EMPLOYMENT 
Figure 3: Carbon-intensive sectors in the BoE list of eligible bonds and UK employment 
 
Sources: Bank of England (bond ISIN codes, as of 4 June 2020), TR Eikon (NACE 4-digit sectors and bond outstanding amount, June 2020), 
ONS, Annual Business Survey (employment, 2018) and authors’ calculations 
A2. FROM THE UNIVERSE OF STERLING BONDS TO THE 
BOE LIST OF ELIGIBLE BONDS  
We downloaded data for the universe of corporate bonds from Thomson Reuters (TR) 
Eikon and we applied the following BoE criteria step-by-step: 
the bond has been issued in sterling by companies that do not belong to the following: 
TR Eikon sectors: banks; independent finance; official and muni; life insurance, 
mortgage banking; securities; and supranational (see Column 1 in Table 2); 
• the residual maturity of the bond is at least three months and the bond were 
issued at least one month before the BoE list of eligible bonds was published (see 
Column 2 in Table 2); 
• the bond is rated investment grade (see Column 3 in Table 2);19 
• the amount in issue is at least £100m (see Column 4 in Table 2). 
The BoE also applies some additional criteria, the most important of which is that the 
bond issuers make a material contribution to the UK economy.20 The BoE considers a 
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0
Carbon-intensive
transportation
Utilities
Energy-intensive
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Share of Total (%) 
Outstanding amount in the BoE list UK employment
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number of factors to identify this, including the number of employees that the company 
has in the UK, the revenues that the company generates in the UK and the extent to 
which the company has headquarters in the UK. Since the criterion about the material 
contribution to the UK economy is not strictly defined by the BoE and it seems that the 
selection process involves some discretion, we are not in a position to generate the BoE 
list captured by the last column of Table 2 based on specific criteria.21 
The BoE list comprises of 382 bonds whose outstanding amount is £148bn. The list 
captured by column 5 includes initially all the bonds that are part of the BoE list. The 
match between the bonds and the companies that have issued them is made by using 
the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). As explained in A3, our 
analysis requires the identification of the 4-digit NACE sector of the bond issuer. The 
bonds for which the NACE sector is not available in TR Eikon are thereby excluded from 
our analysis. Therefore, the ultimate number of bonds in the column 4 list is 1040 (with 
an outstanding amount of £428bn). We also keep 355 bonds from the BoE list which 
correspond to £140bn.  
A3. IDENTIFYING THE ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT OF 
BONDS 
We use four ways by which we identify the environmental footprint of each bond:  
(1) Whether the NACE 4-digit sector of the issuer corresponds to carbon-intensive activities. 
We identify carbon-intensive sectors following Battiston and Monasterolo (2019)22. The 
starting point is the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS) classification, presented in 
Battiston et al. (2017)23 and Alessi et al. (2019)24. This classification specifies sectors that 
can be affected by climate policies and are subject to transition climate risks. However, 
not all of these sectors are necessarily carbon intensive. Battiston and Monasterolo 
(2019)25 have identified four carbon-intensive sectors, which are a subset of CPRS: (i) 
fossil-fuel companies; (ii) energy-intensive companies; (iii) utilities and (iv) carbon-
intensive transportation. We have identified NACE 4-digit codes that correspond to 
carbon-intensive sectors following the rationale of their classification. Note that 
someone could argue that utilities that generate electricity from renewable energy 
sources should not be included in the carbon-intensive sectors. Although this is true, we 
have limited information about the sources of power generation in utilities, which 
prevents us from clearly identifying which utilities rely solely on renewables.   
(2) Whether the NACE 4-digit sector of the issuer corresponds to potentially green 
activities. We use the recently developed EU Taxonomy of sustainable activities26 in 
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order to specify what we call ‘potentially green’ sectors. The EU Taxonomy identifies 
NACE 4-digit sectors that can contribute to climate mitigation via activities that (i) are 
already low-carbon, (ii) are not low-carbon but can contribute to the transition to a low-
carbon economy by reducing emissions, and/or (iii) enable other activities to achieve 
emissions reductions. A limitation of this EU classification is that it includes many 
carbon-intensive sectors; this is primarily because there are various transition activities 
that can be undertaken in these sectors. Although we acknowledge the need for 
promoting activities that reduce emissions in carbon-intensive sectors, we find it 
misleading to call these activities ‘green’. It would be more accurate to argue that these 
are ‘dirty’ activities, whose degree of dirtiness can decline. Thus, in our ‘potentially 
green’ sectors we include all these NACE sectors that are part of the EU Taxonomy for 
climate mitigation but are not carbon intensive. The only exception that we make is the 
real estate sector. Although this sector is included in the EU taxonomy and is not 
carbon-intensive, we think is not accurate enough to call it ‘potentially green’, since its 
contribution to emission reduction is likely to be very small.      
The reason why our sectors are called ‘potentially green’ is that we do not have sufficient 
information to decide if the activities conducted by these sectors are actually green. The 
EU Taxonomy has specified screening criteria that include thresholds for metrics related, 
for example, to emission and energy generation. However, we do not have access to 
such detailed information at a sufficient granular level for all companies that are 
included in our analysis. As we explain below, we are able to only partially use the 
company-level emissions intensity (when this is available by TR Eikon).  
(3) Whether the bond is classified as green. We use the green bond flag provided by TR 
Eikon. Eikon defines green bonds as fixed income products that offers investors the 
opportunity to participate in the financing of large sustainable, green energy projects 
that help mitigate climate change and help countries adapt to the effects of climate 
change. 
(4) The relative carbon intensity of the issuer. We use the company-level emission intensity 
provided by TR Eikon. This is equal to the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 CO2 equivalent 
emissions of the issuers over the company revenues. The data that we use refers to the 
2018/19 financial year. The relative emission intensity is given by dividing the emission 
intensity of each by the mean emission intensity in the 1-digit NACE sector that the 
sector of the company belongs to. 
Note that a large number of corporate bonds are issued by companies that engage in 
financial services and insurance activities (sectors K.64, K.65 and K.66). Following 
Battiston and Monasterolo (2019), for the bonds that have been issued by these 
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companies, we use the NACE codes and the emission intensity of the ultimate parent 
companies. In addition, if the NACE code of the parent companies is the same as the 
NACE of the K.64, K.65 and K.66 issuers, but TR Eikon provides information which 
clearly shows that the issuer supports directly a company that engages in carbon-
intensive or potentially green activities, the bond is reclassified.      
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